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One of the most noticeable trends in recent years has been the increasing reliance of public 
decision-making processes (bureaucratic, legislative and legal) on algorithms, i.e. computer 
programmed step-by-step instructions for taking a given set of inputs and producing an output. 
The question raised by this article is whether the rise of such algorithmic governance creates 
problems for the moral or political legitimacy of our public decision-making processes. Ignoring 
common concerns with data protection and privacy, it is argued that algorithm-driven decision-
making does pose a significant threat to the legitimacy of such processes. Modeling my 
argument on Estlund’s threat of epistocracy, I call this the ‘threat of algocracy’. The article 
clarifies the nature of this threat, and addresses two possible solutions (named, respectively, 
“resistance” and “accommodation”). It is argued that neither solution is likely to be successful, at 
least not without risking many other things we value about social decision-making. The result is 
a somewhat pessimistic conclusion in which we confront the possibility that we are creating 





 1. Introduction 
  We live in an age of algorithmic decision-making. There are algorithms trading 
stocks on Wall Street (Patterson 2013); algorithms determining who is the most likely 
to be guilty of tax evasion (Zarsky 2013); algorithms assisting in scientific discovery 
(Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 2013); and algorithms helping us in dating and mating 
(Slater 2013). This is just a small sample: many more could be listed (Siegel 2013). 
With the ongoing data revolution, and the transition towards the so-called “Internet of 
Things” this trend can only be set to grow (Kitchin 2014a; Kellermeit & Obodovski 
2013; Rifkin 2014).  
 
 The question raised by this article is whether the use of such algorithm-based 
decision-making in the public and political sphere is problematic. Suppose that the 
creation of new legislation, or the adjudication of a legal trial, or the implementation of 
a regulatory policy relies heavily on algorithmic assistance. Would the resulting outputs 
be morally problematic? As public decision-making processes that issue coercive rules 
and judgments, it is widely agreed that such processes should be morally and politically 
legitimate (Peter 2014). Could algorithm-based decision-making somehow undermine 
this legitimacy? 
 
 In this article, I argue that it could. Although many are concerned about the 
hiddenness of algorithmic decision-making, I argue that there is an equally (if not more) 
serious problem concerning its opacity (potential incomprehensibility to human 
reasoning). Using David Estlund’s (1993; 2003; 2008) threat of epistocracy argument as 
my model, I argue that increasing reliance on algorithms gives rise to the threat of 
algocracy – a situation in which algorithm-based systems structure and constrain the 
opportunities for human participation in, and comprehension of, public decision-
making. This is a significant threat, one that is difficult to accommodate or resist.  
 
 The article proceeds as follows. In section 2, I clarify the phenomenon of 
interest, explaining what is and is not meant by my use of the term ‘algocracy’. In 
section 3, I make the case for the potential ‘threat’. In section 4, I argue it is morally 
undesirable to resist the threat. And in section 5, I argue that it is hard to accommodate 
the threat in a satisfactory manner. I conclude on a somewhat pessimistic note, 
  
highlighting the fact that we may be creating a governance structure that has 
instrumental and procedural virtues, but sacrifices human control and comprehension. 
 
 
 2. What is algocracy? 
 The term ‘algocracy’ has the potential to mislead. I use it in a precise manner 
here, building upon previous uses of the same term (Aneesh 2006; 2008), and linking it 
to the related concept of ‘epistocracy’ in political philosophy (Estlund 1993; 2003; 
2008; and, particularly, Lippert-Rasmussen 2012).  
 
 Let me start by preempting and heading-off some potential misconceptions. I do 
not use the term to describe a system in which computers or artificial agents seize 
control of governmental decision-making bodies and then exercise power in way that 
serves their needs and interests. Something of that sort may be possible in the future, 
but I am here concerned with a more mundane (and extant) phenomenon.1 Also, I do not 
mean for the term to carry pejorative connotations. The suffix ‘cracy’, when added to 
the end of related words like ‘bureaucracy’ and ‘technocracy’ often has such 
connotations, but this need not be the case. After all, the term ‘democracy’ has the same 
suffix and typically has positive (or at least neutral) connotations. I intend for the bare 
term ‘algocracy’ to have similarly neutral connotations. As will become clear below 
(section 3), I think that algocratic systems can have many positive qualities; it is just 
that they can also have negative qualities, some of which are identified by the argument 
to the threat of algocracy. 
 
 I use the term ‘algocracy’ to describe a particular kind of governance system, one 
which is organised and structured on the basis of computer-programmed algorithms.2 
To be more precise, I use it to describe a system in which algorithms are used to collect, 
collate and organise the data upon which decisions are typically made, and to assist in 
how that data is processed and communicated through the relevant governance system. 
In doing so, the algorithms structure and constrain the ways in which humans within 
                                                            
1 The possibility of an intelligent AI controlling the world is explored at length in Bostrom 2014. 
2 I add ‘computer programmed’ here since algorithms are, in effect, recipes or step-by-step instructions 
for deriving outputs from a set of inputs. As such, algorithms do not need to be implemented by some 
2 I add ‘computer programmed’ here since algorithms are, in effect, recipes or step-by-step instructions 
for deriving outputs from a set of inputs. As such, algorithms do not need to be implemented by some 
computer architecture, but I limit interest to computer-programmed variants because the threat of 
algocracy is acutely linked to the data-revolution (Kitchin 2014a). 
  
those systems interact with one another, the relevant data, and the broader community 
affected by those systems. This can be done by algorithms packaging and organizing the 
information in a particular way or even by algorithms forcing changes in the structure of 
the physical environment in which the humans operate (Kitchin and Dodge 2011). Such 
systems may be automated or semi-automated,3 or may retain human supervision and 
input.  
 
 In using the term in this sense, I build upon pre-existing uses in the sociological 
literature. Aneesh (2006; 2009) for instance uses ‘algocracy’ in his analysis of labour 
migration to denote an organisational system that is distinct from a market or a 
bureaucracy. For Aneesh, a market is a system in which prices structure and constrain 
the ways in which humans act; a bureaucracy is a system in which laws and regulations 
structure and constrain the ways in which humans act; and an algocracy is a system in 
which algorithms structure and constrain the ways in which humans act. The boundaries 
between such systems are not precise: they often integrate with and overlap with one 
another. This is important in the present context because, as I understand them, 
algocratic decision-making systems can be integrated into pre-existing legal-
bureaucratic decision-making systems.4  
 
 In adopting this definition, one can remain agnostic about the precise 
technological basis for an algocratic system. Nevertheless, I will give a more specific 
sense of the phenomenon with which I am concerned. I am particularly concerned about 
the growth in algocratic systems that are based on predictive or descriptive data-mining 
algorithms (Kitchin 2014a). I follow Zarsky (and others) in defining data-mining as: 
“the non-trivial process of identifying valid, novel, potentially useful and ultimately 
understandable patterns in data” (Zarsky 2011, 291). These patterns can be used 
descriptively — to explain or understand what has happened in the past — or 
predictively — to preempt or anticipate future behaviour. To give an example of the 
former, data-mining could be used to trawl through financial records to detect past 
instances of fraud. To give an example of the latter, data-mining could be used to 
predict, from historical datasets, which criminal is most likely to reoffend, or who is 
most likely to be a terrorist. One of the distinctive features of such data-mining systems 
                                                            
3 Dormehl gives some striking illustrations of bureaucratic systems that are automated, e.g. the facial 
recognition algorithm system used to revoke driving licences in Massachusetts (Dormehl 2014, 157-58) 
4 There are also connections here with Lessig’s work (1999 and 2006) on code as a type of regulatory 
architecture. Lessig is concerned primarily with who owns and controls that architecture; I am concerned 
with ways in which that architecture facilitates a lack of transparency in public decision-making. 
  
in the modern era is that they rely on extremely large datasets (“Big Data”), collected 
from growing networks of data-monitoring technologies. Humans can be more or less 
involved in the data-mining process and in the kinds of decisions made on foot of the 
data-mining process. Humans can predetermine the patterns that data-mining algorithms 
search for (“subject-based searches”), or they can allow the algorithms to find the 
patterns (“pattern-based searches”) (Zarsky 2011, 291-292); humans can review and 
scrutinise the recommendations made by algorithms, or they can essentially leave it up 
to the machines, acting as mere implementers of algorithm-based judgments. In some 
cases, the systems can be entirely automated.  
 
 The debate about military drones has generated some useful distinctions between 
types of robotic weapon system that is relevant to this topic. They are (Citron & 
Pasquale 2014): 
 
Human-in-the-loop weapons: Robots can only select targets and deliver force 
with a human command. 
 
Human-on-the-loop weapons: Robots can select targets and deliver force on their 
own, but there is human oversight and the possibility of human override. 
 
Human-out-of-the-loop weapons: Robots act autonomously, selecting targets and 
delivering force without human oversight or override. 
 
We are not concerned with robotic weapons here, of course, but the distinctions can be 
applied to any algocratic system. Take a tax law-enforcement system as an example. A 
human-in-the-loop version could rely on algorithms to select targets for auditing, but 
only if a human agent requests or demands this. Conversely, a human-on-the-loop 
system could work autonomously, constantly sorting through collected data, identifying 
important patterns, and automatically issuing recommendations, arrest warrants or even 
court summonses. These would ultimately be implemented by human agents who would 
choose whether or not to follow what the algorithm tells them. Human-out-of-the-loop 
systems would leave everything up to the machines.  
 
 One final conceptual distinction is needed before we can proceed to the argument 
proper. When considering the extent of human involvement in algocratic systems, we 
  
need to be aware that some systems make this easier than others. There is a distinction 
between data-mining systems that are ‘interpretable’ and those that are ‘non-
interpretable’ (Zarsky 2011 & 2013). The former are based on rationales and factors 
that can be interpreted and understood by human beings – in short that can be “reduced 
to a human language explanation” (Zarsky 2011, 293). Non-interpretable systems 
cannot be reduced to such explanations. They rely on factors that are too complex for 
humans to understand. If such systems were in place, even if humans were still “on” or 
“in” the loop, they may be ill-equipped to second-guess the algorithmic judgment. This 
is particularly important given the growth in the use of machine learning algorithms to 
find patterns and make predictions from data. Interpretability is a recognized problem in 
that field. I return to this in due course. 
 
 
 3. What is the threat of algocracy? 
 For the purposes of this discussion,5 the recent growth in algocratic systems can 
be said to raise two moral and political concerns: 
 
Hiddenness Concern: This is the concern about the manner in which our data is 
collected and used by these systems. People are concerned that this is done in a 
covert and hidden manner, without the consent of those whose data it is. 
 
Opacity Concern: This is a concern about the intellectual and rational basis for 
these algocratic systems. There is a worry that these systems work in ways that 
are inaccessible or opaque to human reason and understanding. 
 
The first of these concerns has given rise to a rich literature,6 a contentious political 
debate7 and a range of legal regulations and guidelines.8 For example, in 2014 the 
European Court of Justice delivered a verdict striking down a European data retention 
directive.9 The directive required telecoms operators to store data about their customers 
                                                            
5 Debates about other systems, e.g. automated cars and weapon systems, can raise other moral and 
political issues. 
6 For an overview, see the Stanford Law Review symposium issue on Privacy and Big Data. Available at: 
http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data (visited 10/4/14) 
7 The Edward Snowden controversy being, perhaps, the most conspicuous example of this. 
8 For example, the European Directive on this is Directive 95/46/EC 
9 Case C-293/12 (joined with Case C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland Ltd v. Minister for Communications, 
Marine and Natural Resources, and Ors 8th April 2014 
  
for up to two years. The court struck this down on the grounds that it “entail[ed] a wide-
ranging and particularly serious interference with the fundamental rights to respect for 
private life and to the protection of personal data.”10 As is apparent from this statement, 
the normative grounding for the hiddenness concern lies in concepts of privacy and 
control over personal information. 
 
 The opacity concern is rather different and has generated less debate (although 
this is now beginning to change). The opacity concern has nothing to do with privacy 
and control over personal information, although it is testament to the overpowering 
nature of the hiddenness concern that those few theorists who have begun to discuss 
opacity often couch their analysis in terms of privacy or personal information (Morozov 
2013; Crawford & Schultz 2014). The opacity concern has to do with our participation 
in political procedures, and how this participation is undermined by growing use of 
algocratic systems. The normative grounding for this concern is in concepts of political 
authority and legitimacy.11 I will explain this normative grounding first before 
proceeding to defend an argument in relation to the opacity concern. This argument will 
constitute the threat of algocracy. 
 
 Legitimacy is the property that coercive public decision-making processes must 
possess if they are to rightfully exercise the requisite authority over our lives. There are 
many different accounts of what it is that makes a decision-making procedure legitimate 
(Peter 2014). Broadly speaking, there are three schools of thought. The pure 
instrumentalists think that a procedure gains legitimacy solely in virtue of its 
consequences: procedures are instruments that have normative aims (reducing crime, 
increasing well-being etc.), and the better they are at achieving those aims, the more 
legitimate they are.12 Contrariwise, the pure proceduralists think that it is difficult to 
know what the ideal outcome is in advance. Hence, they tend to emphasise the need for 
our procedures to exhibit certain outcome-independent virtues (Peter 2008). For 
example, they might argue that our procedures should create ideal speech situations, 
allowing for those who are affected by them to comprehend what is going on, and to 
contribute to the decision-making process (Habermas 1990). It is also possible to adopt 
                                                            
10 Ibid, para. 65 
11 There may also, of course, be a connection here with a more substantive conception of justice (Ceva 
2012). 
12 I’m not sure that there are any pure instrumentalists, but those who endorse an epistemic theory of 
democracy certainly emphasise this virtue (Estlund 2008; List & Goodin 2001) 
  
mixed or pluralist approaches to legitimacy, which focus on both the properties of the 
procedures and their outcomes.  
 
 I favour the mixed approach. There are two reasons for this. First, because I 
believe pure versions of instrumentalism and proceduralism can lead to odd conclusions 
about the legitimacy of a procedure.13 If all you cared about was the outcome of a 
decision-making procedure, you might be able to justify an evidence-gathering process 
that included cruel or inhumane treatment of human witnesses, provided that such 
treatment facilitated a more accurate decision. Likewise, if all you cared about was the 
procedure itself, you might be able to justify a process which clearly led to a decision 
with bad consequences simply because it treated people with respect and allowed them 
some meaningful participation. Neither of these is intuitively appealing. Second, the 
concept of an ‘outcome’ or a ‘procedure’ is sufficiently fuzzy to allow for plenty of 
debate about what counts as being part of an outcome and part of a procedure. Is an 
evidence-gathering procedure that treats someone inhumanely but gathers accurate 
information warranted because of its outcomes? Or should the longer-term suffering of 
the person from whom the information is gathered be included in any assessment of 
those outcomes? The answer is not entirely clear, but instrumentalists might be inclined 
to favour the latter view since inhumane treatment feels like something that should 
undermine the legitimacy of a decision-making process. The advantage of the mixed 
approach is that does not need to concern itself with such debates. The treatment of the 
witness is relevant either way. This is important because in favouring the mixed 
approach one sometimes needs to assess decision-making processes in light of the trade 
offs between their instrumental and procedural virtues.  
 
 With the normative grounding clarified, the opacity problem can be articulated. It 
helps to do this by way of analogy with Estlund’s threat of epistocracy argument 
(Estlund 2003 & 2008; Machin 2009; Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). Estlund’s argument is 
that those who are enamoured with outcome-oriented approaches to legitimacy may be 
forced to endorse the legitimacy of epistocratic systems of governance. He points out 
that if we assume (plausibly) that legitimacy-conferring outcomes are more likely to be 
achieved by those with better epistemic abilities, then the following argument seems 
compelling: 
 
                                                            
13 The oddness reflects arguments in the consequentialist/deontologist debate in ethics. 
  
(1) There are procedure-independent outcomes against which the legitimacy of 
public decision-making procedures ought to be judged. (Cognitivist Thesis) 
 
(2) In any given society, there will be a group of people with superior epistemic 
access to these procedure-independent outcomes. (Elitist Thesis) 
 
(3) If there are people with superior epistemic access to these procedure 
independent outcomes, then procedures are more likely to be legitimate if those 
people are given sole or predominant decision-making authority. 
 
(4) Therefore, in any given society, decision-making procedures are more likely 
to be legitimate if authority is concentrated in an epistemic elite. (Authority 
Thesis) 
 
The argument depends on a normative claim (viz. outcomes confer legitimacy on 
decisions) and two factual claims. The first factual claim is that there is such a thing as 
an epistemic elite, a sub-group of the population with superior epistemic access to the 
legitimacy-conferring outcomes; the second is that handing over decision-making 
authority to this sub-group is likely to get us closer to those outcomes. There are ways 
in which we could critique these factual assumptions (Lippert-Rasmussen 2012). But I 
will not do so here since my goal is not to defend Estlund’s argument but to develop a 
similar but different argument.  
 
To do this, I need to consider in more detail what is meant by an ‘epistocracy’ and 
how it relates that of algocracy. Estlund defines the concept of epistocracy (2003, 53) 
by reference to sub-populations of human societies with generally superior epistemic 
capabilities. For him, this sub-population constitutes an epistemically elite group of 
citizens who, if the logic of the argument is to be followed, get to control and detain 
power across all public decision-making processes. Thus, when he talks about the threat 
of epistocracy he seems to be talking about a threat emanating from stable group of 
human agents who are allocated significant social power. But, as Lippert-Rasmussen 
(2012) points out, this conflation of epistocracy with a stable and generally elite sub-
population is misleading; epistocracy is a broader concept than that. A sub-population 
could have superior epistemic access to legitimizing outcomes for emergent and highly 
contingent reasons. In other words, the individual members of the sub-population need 
  
not have generally superior epistemic abilities. They may have superior access for a 
limited set of decisions, for a narrowly constrained period of time, or because the sub-
population as a whole (and not any individual) emergently satisfies some set of 
conditions that enables them to have superior epistemic access.14 The crucial point is 
that the sub-population is epistemically superior and is favoured for this reason. This 
epistemic favouring is what turns a democracy into an epistocracy. 
 
If we adopt this broader definition of epistocracy, the threat alluded to by 
Estlund’s argument would arise whenever we favour a sub-population of decision-
makers for epistemic reasons. This broader definition is more in keeping with the 
concept of algocracy. An algocratic system is one organised on the basis of algorithms 
which structure and constrain the opportunities for human interaction with that system. 
One could imagine people favouring the implementation of such systems for epistemic 
reasons – in other words, because such systems are thought to have some privileged or 
superior epistemic access to legitimacy-conferring outcomes, when compared to a 
purely human alternative. Thus, when I talk about a threat of ‘algocracy’, I am talking 
about a threat that arises from this sort of epistemic favouring of algocratic systems.  
 
 The question, of course, is whether favouring such systems undermines 
legitimacy. Estlund thinks it does in the case of epistocractic systems. His argument is 
that such systems are problematic because they fail to satisfy important legitimacy 
conditions of general acceptability, reasonable rejectability, and publicity. In Estlund’s 
model this means that the procedures must be justifiable to people in terms of reasons 
that are accessible and comprehensible to them (Estlund 2008; Machin 2009). This 
requires non-opacity: the rationales underlying the mechanics of the procedure must not 
be opaque to those who are affected by those procedures. In appealing to non-opacity 
conditions he is not alone. Many theories of political legitimacy insist that decision-
making procedures must be rationally acceptable to those who are affected by them 
(Gaus 2010). And others equally insist that this requires procedures in which people can 
participate and deliberate (see discussions in Machin 2009; Habermas 1990; Besson and 
Marti 2006).  
 
                                                            
14 A classic example would be if the sub-population satisfies the conditions for the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem or one of its extrapolations (e.g. List and Goodin, 2001). 
  
 The problem with epistocratic systems is that these non-opacity requirements may 
fail to be met. Relevant sub-populations may not have access to the rationales 
underlying their decisions (they may know more than they can tell);15 they may have 
access but may not be able to make them comprehensible to the general population 
(Machin 2009 discusses the difficulties with this); or their epistemic superiority may be 
attributable to contingent or emergent factors that they themselves are unable to fully 
articulate. Initially we (or someone) may know that they satisfy relevant conditions of 
superiority, but over time we may lose sight of those conditions whilst still maintaining 
deference to that sub-population.16  
 
 My argument is that algocratic systems can likewise fail to meet the requirements 
of non-opacity. Indeed, the likelihood of non-opacity may be even higher in the case of 
algocratic systems. This is why it is meaningful to refer to a ‘threat’ of algocracy. The 
threat is one that can sneak up on us. We may initially favour algocratic governance 
systems for appropriate instrumental reasons, impressed by their greater speed, accuracy 
and insight (when compared to similar human systems), and we may be keen to take 
advantage of their impressive results. But in favouring them we may end up with 
systems that are increasingly opaque. Morozov expresses the point rather nicely:17  
 
Thanks to smartphones or Google Glass, we can now be pinged whenever we 
are about to do something stupid, unhealthy or unsound. We wouldn’t 
necessarily need to know why the action would be wrong: the system’s 
algorithms do the moral calculus on their own. Citizens take on the role of 
information machines that feed the techno-bureaucratic complex with our data. 
And why wouldn’t we, if we are promised slimmer waistlines, cleaner air, or 
longer (and safer) lives in return? 
 
We then become trapped, as Morozov puts it, in a web of “invisible barbed wire”. We 
are convinced that the algorithmic control systems enhance our autonomy, increase our 
health and well-being, and improve social outcomes, but we don’t have clear sense of 
                                                            
15 This is a reference to the work of Michael Polanyi (1966). 
16 Estlund offers alternative arguments for thinking that epistocracies are politically problematic. These 
have to do with reasonable rejection on the grounds of suspicion of the epistemic elite. I ignore those 
arguments here since they tie into his conflation of epistocracy with rule by a stable group of generally 
superior human agents. 
17 Morozov (2013) - see the subsection entitled “Even programmes that seem innocuous can undermine 
democracy” for this quote. 
  
how exactly they manage to do this. The result is social spaces that are opaque to human 
reason.18 
 
 A simple illustration might help to underscore this point.19 In recent years, the 
online retailer Amazon has taken to stocking some of its large warehouses using a 
“chaotic storage algorithm” (Greenfield 2012; Bumbulsky 2013). For centuries, humans 
have stocked warehouses and similar storage facilities by following their own 
“algorithms”. For example, they might stock them by grouping similar items together 
(books, DVDs, home furniture, appliances etc.) and then subdividing those groups 
along various lines (e.g. alphabetical order, sub-genre, type of furniture or appliance). 
The rationales behind these storage systems make sense, and are clearly understandable 
by ordinary human beings. Furthermore, the process of identifying items and fulfilling 
orders is one that humans can fully comprehend and participate in. The chaotic storage 
algorithm system is rather different. The system works by tagging every item that enters 
the warehouse with a barcode and then assigning it to a location in the warehouse based 
on available shelf-space. This is done by algorithm. The result is a system that is 
apparently far more efficient (less wasted product, faster turnover of stock), and in 
which very different products are located side-by-side on the shelves. When it comes 
time to fill an order, a human worker20 must rely on an algorithm to plot a course 
through the warehouse for them to pick up the various items. 
 
 This creates a very interesting physical working environment. It is one in which 
humans are “on the loop”, but whose organisation is determined by the algorithms and 
whose physical space cannot be navigated (by humans) without algorithmic assistance. 
There is consequently deference to the epistemic superiority of the algocratic system. 
Now, to be clear, the chaotic storage system is not completely opaque to human reason. 
It has an underlying purpose that can be followed by human beings (viz. assignment 
based on shelf-space leads to greater efficiency). That purpose is attractive, even 
appealing to the humans who create it. Who wouldn’t want a more efficient storage 
system?  The problem is that the actual mechanics of the algorithm are too complex for 
any one human to follow. A human could not keep track of the barcodes, nor the 
                                                            
18 The society that worries Morozov is no imaginative dystopia. It is actively pursued by some: see Alex 
Pentland (2014) 
19 I take this illustration from the artist James Bridle who uses it in some of his talks. See 
http://shorttermmemoryloss.com/ for more. 
20 For the time being anyway. It is likely that, in the future, robot workers will take over such systems. 
Amazon already works with Kiva robots in some warehouses. See 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3UxZDJ1HiPE (visited 1/3/15) for a video illustration. 
  
available shelf space. They need to outsource all of this understanding to the machine. 
The result is that they start to imprison themselves in the “invisible barbed wire” 
mentioned by Morozov. 
 
 My argument for the threat of algocracy works on the belief that what is 
happening in Amazon warehouses can happen on a much larger and more invidious 
scale in public decision-making procedures. We could introduce and defer to more and 
more algocratic systems, starting with ones that are relatively easy to follow, but which 
morph into systems that are far more complex and outside the upper limits of human 
reason. It will be much more difficult to fall back on the need for participation and 
comprehension here because the scope for genuine human participation will be much 
more limited: the algorithms will be organizing and manipulating vast streams of data 
and will be grafted on top of an increasingly complex ecosystem of other algorithms. 
The result is that we end up with a set of decision-making procedures that are depleted 
of their legitimacy. 
 
 This can be summarised as a simple argument: 
 
(5) Legitimate decision-making procedures must allow for human participation 
in and comprehension of those decision-making procedures.  
  
(6) Increasing reliance on algocratic systems limits the scope for active human 
participation in and comprehension of decision-making procedures.   
 
(7) Therefore, reliance on algocratic systems is a threat to legitimate decision-
making procedures. 
 
There are two initial doubts one might have about this argument. First, we may wonder 
whether we can simply create algorithmic systems that allow for participation and 
comprehension (contrary to the claims of premise 6). And second, we may wonder 
whether this threat is really posed by the systems themselves, or the elite group of 
programmers and coders who design them. 
 
 The first of these doubts draws our attention to the nature of the participation and 
comprehension requirements. What level of understanding is needed in order for 
  
legitimacy to be achieved? If, for example, we had a complicated tax-evasion 
monitoring algorithm, wouldn’t it be enough for people to simply know that the system 
works by identifying those most likely to be tax evaders (just as the Amazon workers 
know, roughly, how the system works and its purpose)? Do they really need to know 
precisely which factors trigger the system? In other words, isn’t a coarse-grained 
description of the rational basis for the system enough? No; this shouldn’t be enough. If 
we are to respect the moral equality of individual citizens, we cannot legitimately 
exercise coercive authority over them in such a manner. It is not enough for them to 
simply know that the system is more likely to reach preferred outcomes; they must be 
able to scrutinise and critically engage with the factors that enable the system to do this. 
This doesn’t mean that an extremely fine-grained understanding of the algocratic system 
is required, but we need more that just the general rationale.  
 
 But then we may ask: why can’t we simply ensure that we create algorithmic 
systems that are more amenable to such understanding and participation? In principle 
this may be possible, but three factors combine to make it exceptionally difficult. The 
first is that many algorithmic systems are protected by secrecy laws, either because they 
are based on ‘trade secrets’ and associated commercial interests, or because they are 
used by government agencies and there are governmental interests in preventing people 
from gaming or hacking these systems (Pasquale 2015 discusses this issue at length). 
Laws of this sort could be dismantled and reconstructed to facilitate greater 
transparency, but the difficulty of doing so should not be underestimated given the 
powerful commercial and governmental interests at stake. The second factor is that 
modern data-mining systems increasingly rely on machine learning algorithms. This is 
partly due to the increase in the size of the datasets that must be mined for useful 
information. The unique thing about such algorithms is that humans do not have to pre-
select or pre-determine the rules or principles the algorithms use to perform their tasks; 
instead the algorithms can be trained on large datasets to generate their own rules and 
principles. Famous examples include product-recommendation algorithms and IBM’s 
Watson. The problem is that the interpretability of the outputs of such algorithms is a 
significant and recognised problem in the field of machine learning.21 The algorithms 
are often not able to tell programmers exactly why they produce the outputs they do. 
People are working on more interpretable methods, but there seem to tradeoffs involved 
                                                            
21 For example, neural network models are widely recognized as having an interpretability problem. See, 
for example, the discussion in Miner et al 2014, 249. 
  
in making such systems more interpretable (Vellido, Guerrero and Lisboa 2012; Lisboa 
2013; Otte 2013; Chase Lipton 2015; Zeng, Ustun and Rudin 2015).22 Finally, 
compounding these two problems, there is the fact algorithms are not singular 
phenomena. Any new algorithm is likely to be grafted on top of others, collectively 
authored by teams of coders using pre-existing coded architectures, and then woven into 
increasingly complex algorithmic ecosystems (Seaver 2013; Kitchin 2014a & 2014b). It 
is the interaction between all the members of this algorithmic ecosystem that produces 
the useful output, not the operation of the single new algorithm. But when you have 
such a complex ecosystem, the scope for individual participation and understanding is 
further limited. Even if it were possible for an individual to deconstruct and understand 
the system as a whole, it would be an extremely time-consuming and labourious 
process.23 A lack of opacity is consequently likely. 
 
 This leads to the second worry.24 Isn’t it true to say that in the case of any 
algocratic system there is a set of human elites behind it? Thus, the threat is not posed 
by deference to the systems themselves, but rather to the elites that programme and 
engineer them. This looks right at a first glance. In the case of something like the 
Amazon chaotic storage algorithm, there is a group of algorithm designers and company 
management who use their preferred ideology to create an algocratic system that 
structures their warehouses and constrains their workers. A similar process would surely 
be followed in other domains: politicians (or other public authorities) would present 
project ‘specs’ to computer programmers, who would then use their superior epistemic 
abilities to create an algocratic system that implements the relevant ideological aim 
(‘efficiency’, “crime reduction”, “well-being enhancement” or whatever). But (a) as just 
mentioned, there as ways in which such systems could go beyond the comprehension of 
even these elites; and (b) even if true, this should provide us with no real solace as 
ceding political authority to such a group is also procedurally problematic. It reduces 




                                                            
22 It is also worth noting that ‘interpretability’, for many working in this field, seems to mean 
‘interpretability by appropriately trained peers’. This would be insufficient for political purposes. 
23 I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for encouraging further discussion of this issue. 
24 I am indebted to DI for pressing me on this point. This reduction would raise similar kinds of concerns 
to those animating Lessig in his classic works on the topic (1999 & 2006). 
  
 4. Should we resist the threat? 
 If the threat is real, should we do something to resist it and to protect the 
legitimacy of our political system? This certainly seems to be the view of some 
commentators. Evgeny Morozov (2013), for example, urges us to politicise the problem 
and sabotage the system in order to protect our democratic values. Some people may be 
attracted to this model of political resistance but there are two reasons to question it. 
First, it is not clear that resistance of this sort would be practically achievable across the 
full spectrum of public decision-making processes. Second, and probably more 
importantly, it is not clear that resistance of this sort is morally preferable: there is a 
moral case to be made for the use of algocratic systems both on instrumentalist and 
proceduralist grounds. There is consequently a tradeoff of values involved that may 
render accommodation more appropriate than resistance. 
 
 The practicality of resistance is not my major concern here, but if we assume that 
resistance requires us to block and dismantle algocratic systems, then there are two 
hurdles that are worth noting. The first is simply the increasing ubiquity of the relevant 
technologies, in particular the data-monitoring technologies that feed algocratic 
systems. The second is the increasing hiddenness of those technologies. Ubiquity and 
hiddenness might look like uncomfortable bedfellows, but the ubiquitous presence of 
data-monitoring and mining technologies often leads them to hide in plain sight. We all 
now make use of technologies with data-mining potential on a daily basis, we do so 
because they are essential to how we live and work, but this can often desensitise or 
blind us to the algocratic possibilities. We know the systems there, but we are not fully 
cognisant of their uses and effects. This trend is only likely to increase as monitoring 
technologies become smaller, more efficient, and more ubiquitous (Brin 1997). 
 
 More important than this, however, is the overarching desirability of algocratic 
systems. The ‘threat’ of algocracy challenges such systems because of their likely 
opacity, but this is just one moral mark against them. It needs to be weighed alongside 
other marks (such as the impact on privacy) and alongside other benefits. It is important 
not to ignore the benefits. There are often powerful instrumental benefits associated 
with the construction and use of algocratic systems (Mayer-Schonberger and Cukier 
2013). We are collecting and drawing together ever-larger datasets, and algocratic 
technologies give us some hope of leveraging those datasets to good effect. This is true 
  
for both social authorities and for the public at large. To give a simple example, smart 
electricity grids, which rely heavily on data-monitoring and mining technologies, can 
help to boost the effectiveness and efficiency of renewable energy sources (Rifkin 2014, 
Ch 5). This is highly desirable in an era of climate change and energy insecurity. 
Amazon’s chaotic storage algorithms — whatever you might think of the company 
itself and its wider work practices — do help to reduce waste and inefficiencies and 
increase profitability. And even self-monitoring and self-tracking apps, like the ones we 
use on our phones everyday, can help to improve individual productivity, health and 
well-being, primarily by helping us with goal setting, self-experimentation and habit 
formation.25  
 
 The same is true when we consider the public sphere. To give an example, tax 
evasion is a major problem: a failure to collect sufficient tax undermines many valuable 
public services. Government revenue agencies (particularly in the wake of the Great 
Recession) are often understaffed and under-resourced. What’s more, the individual 
humans within those agencies are not always capable of exploiting and seeing 
connections between different pools of financial data. Algorithms can help. They can 
mine the relevant data pools for useful patterns, do so tirelessly and efficiently, and 
make recommendations for audits. This could be a great boon for tax collection. The 
benefits are not hypothetical either. It has already been proven that algorithmic systems 
are better at making predictions than human experts in certain fields (Bishop & Trout 
2002; Meehl 1996). Thus, in many instances it may turn out to be true that if we want to 
achieve better outcomes, we would be well-advised to defer to an algocratic system. 
 
 And it is not all about outcomes either. There may be procedural benefits to 
algocratic systems too. Zarsky makes the case for this (2011 & 2012). He argues that 
one major procedural deficiency with human-based decision-making systems is their 
susceptibility to implicit bias. Consider the profiling debate in relation to anti-terrorism 
and crime-prevention as an example. One concern with profiling is that it can arbitrarily 
target and discriminate against certain racial and ethnic minorities. That is something 
that we could do without. If people are going to be targeted by such measures, they need 
to be targeted on legitimate grounds (i.e. because they are genuinely more likely to be 
terrorists or to commit crimes). The problem is that, because of implicit biases, the 
                                                            
25 A stark example of this is the Pavlok, a technology which uses basic principles of psychological 
conditioning to encourage behavioural change. See http://pavlok.com - note how the website promises to 
‘break bad habits in five days’. 
  
human authorities may not be able to do this. Automated algocratic systems could be 
constructed in such a way as to not be prone to the same implicit biases. As such, they 
may be procedurally preferable to human-based systsms. As Zarsky puts it: 
 
[A]utomation introduces a surprising benefit. By limiting the role of human 
discretion and intuition and relying upon computer-driven decisions this process 
protects minorities and other weaker groups. 
  
(Zarsky 2012, 35) 
 
Indeed, Zarsky goes even further and suggests that one explanation for the unease 
towards algocratic systems might be the preference of the privileged majority for 
systems that place the burdens on minorities (Zarsky 2012, 35). Thus, the privileged 
would prefer a profiling system administered by humans, because they could rely on 
those humans being biased in their favour. They could not rely on the automated system 
doing the same. 
 
 I do not wish to endorse Zarsky’s argument here. There are, as he and others have 
noted (Citron & Pasquale 2014), reasons for thinking that automated systems could 
replicate the biases of humans. Algorithm construction is a translation process (Kitchin 
2014b): a problem or task must be converted into a set of step-by-step instructions 
which must in turn be translated into computer code. There is plenty of space in this 
translation process for implicit or even explicit biases to play a role. But if we are 
conscientious about this possibility, we may be able to filter out or reduce the potential 
for bias. In this sense, Zarsky’s argument points us in an interesting direction. It 
suggests that in addition to securing better outcomes, algocratic systems could be 
procedurally fairer to those affected by them. Thus, in assessing how to respond to the 
threat of algocracy, we will need to balance the loss in comprehension and participation 
against the potential gains in outcomes and procedural fairness. The fact that such a 
complex weighting exercise may need to be undertaken should give us some reason to 
reject resistance as a solution to the threat. Perhaps, instead, we should try to keep the 




 5. Can we accommodate the threat? 
 In this section, I look at four accommodating solutions to the threat of algocracy. 
Each of these solutions tries to keep humans in the decision-making loop, and preserve 
their ability to participate in that loop. This would protect against the problem of opacity 
whilst still allowing us to reap the benefits of the algocratic systems. The solutions 
move from the relatively mundane case of insisting upon human review to the more 
outlandish possibilities of human-machine integration. I argue that, in each case, it is 
difficult see how the solution could accommodate the threat by itself, though in various 
combinations they may suffice.  
 
 5.1 - Insist upon human review of algorithms 
 This is a solution that straddles the boundary between resistance and 
accommodation. It tries to avoid the threat of algocracy by keeping humans on the loop, 
and allowing them some substantial review and/or override power.  
 
 A version of this solution is already part of the law in the European Union. 
According to Article 15 of the European Directive 95/46/EC (the Data Protection 
Directive), there must be human review of any automated data-processing system that 
could have a substantial impact on an individual’s life. The official wording is as 
follows (emphasis added): 
 
15.1 - Member States shall grant the right to every person not to be subject to a 
decision which produces legal effects concerning him or significantly affects him 
and which is based solely on automated processing of data intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to him, such as his performance at work, 
creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc. 
 
The Directive does, however, allow for certain exceptions to this rule. Specifically, it 
allows for people to voluntarily contract themselves out of this right, and for 
governments to override it so long as other measures are taken for protecting the 
individual’s “legitimate interests”.26 
 
                                                            
26 Directive 95/46/EC, Art. 15.3 
  
 Similar solutions have been proposed in recent papers from Citron and Pasquale 
(2014; and Citron 2012), and Crawford and Schultz (2014). Both sets of authors are 
concerned with the impact of automated prediction on due process rights. Citron and 
Pasquale focus in particular on algorithms used for assessing creditworthiness. They 
argue that it is essential for the due process rights of those who might be unfairly 
stigmatised by such assessments to be protected. To this end, they call for some 
regulatory oversight of the algorithms, as well as public transparency in how the 
algorithmic systems work. They acknowledge the possibility that such transparency will 
allow individuals to “game the system”, but they dismiss this on the grounds that there 
is no credible evidence in favour of it. Crawford and Schultz cast their net more broadly 
than Citron and Pasquale, covering many different uses of predictive algorithms. 
Nevertheless, their proposed solution is similar. They call for a system of “procedural 
data due process” rights. This would consist of three elements: (i) notice - i.e. subjects 
are made aware when they have been targeted by an algocratic system; (ii) opportunity 
for a fair hearing - i.e. subjects are allowed to review the evidence used against them 
and the algorithmic logic applied; and (iii) judicial review by an impartial adjudicator - 
i.e. subjects are allowed to appeal algocratic decisions to an impartial adjudicator, such 
as a court of law. 
 
 Can human review balance the potential benefits of algocratic systems with the 
concerns about participation and comprehension? There are at least two reasons for 
thinking that it cannot. The first is that the nature of the underlying technology may be 
such that the possibility for human review is blocked. This is particularly true if it relies 
on non-interpretable data-mining processes or if algorithms only make sense when 
understood in relation to the broader ecosystem of algorithms in which they operate. Of 
course, one could perhaps insist (legally) that only interpretable processes be used, but 
as mentioned previously this may reduce the instrumental gains and encounter 
resistance from the corporate or governmental interests that are advanced by such 
processes. In addition to this, it may be very difficult to implement such a solution 
“after-the-fact”, i.e. after the opaque processes have already come to dominate in a 
particular domain. 
 
 The second reason for doubting the reviewability solution is that, to the extent that 
algocratic systems could be made to rely on interpretable processes, the likely effect 
would be to replace the threat of algocracy with the threat of epistocracy. It is highly 
  
unlikely that any particular citizen would have the background knowledge and expertise 
to review, engage and understand the algorithmic processes by themselves. They would 
have to rely on some human epistemic elites to distill and convey the necessary 
information to them. Likewise, courts charged with judicially reviewing algocratic 
decisions would also have to rely on epistemic elites to inform them about how those 
decisions work. It is highly unlikely that any of these actors would have the confidence 
to fully challenge or engage with what these elites would tell them. The result would be 
a new epistemic elite taking over our public decision-making processes, much to the 
chagrin of political theorists like Estlund. This is not something to relish. 
 
 Some may respond to this by arguing that deference to such elites is already part 
and parcel of our public decision-making processes. No one human being is capable of 
understanding all the rationales and reasons for the decisions that affect them. They 
often require the assistance of experts to package and translate difficult ideas, and to 
make decisions on their behalf. This is certainly a feature of the status quo, but it is not 
clear that it is something to be cherished or preserved. It may represent a current 
compromise in the tradeoff between instrumental and procedural virtues, but if we could 
overcome it, we probably should. Also, the viability of this tradeoff may be undermined 
if the asymmetry between the epistemic elites and ordinary citizens is exaggerated or 
accentuated by data-mining technologies. This is something for which a number of 
recent papers argue by highlighting the emerging and increasing ‘big data divide’, 
arising out of disparities in the ability to leverage the benefits of data-mining systems 
between creators/controllers and the citizens who are affected (Andrejevic 2014; 
Mittelstadt and Floridi 2015). 
  
 A more satisfying accommodating solution would try to directly empower those 
who are affected by algocratic decisions, thereby obviating the need for human 
epistemic elites. This is what the three remaining solutions attempt to do. 
 
 5.2 - Epistemic Enhancement of human beings 
 The first of these direct-empowerment solutions is suggested to us by a recent 
paper from Danaher (2013). The paper tries to connect the debate about the use of 
human enhancement technologies with the debate about legitimate decision-making. It 
argues that enhancement technologies could be used to improve the instrumental and 
  
procedural legitimacy of public decision-making processes. Could this argument be co-
opted to address the threat of algocracy? 
 
 We’ll need to understand the argument a bit better before we can answer that 
question. In brief outline, the argument relies on the concept “Epistemic Enhancement”, 
which is defined as “any biomedical intervention intended to improve or add to the 
capacities humans use to acquire knowledge, both theoretical and practical/moral” 
(Danaher 2013, 88). This covers a wide range of potential technologies, from drugs that 
manipulate and enhance cognition and affect, to neural stimulators or implants that do 
the same. The claim is that as long as those technologies “allow those who participate 
[in public decision-making processes] to process more information, dampen distorting 
emotions, remember more facts and so on” (Danaher 2013, 99-100)  they could be used 
to enhance procedural legitimacy. In particular, they could be used to protect against the 
possibility of an epistemic elite taking over, provided that the technologies are made 
available to all. In the process of defending this view, Danaher responds directly to 
charges that a social demand for epistemic enhancement would be coercive or 
autonomy-undermining. 
 
 The proposal is attractive for two reasons. The first is that it focuses directly on 
improving the cognitive and affective capacities of ordinary people who may be 
affected by public decision-making processes. In doing so, it tries to offer an 
(admittedly partial) antidote to the problems of increasing decisional complexity and 
incomprehensibility. This could help to address the threat of algocracy, provided that 
the epistemic enhancement is of the right kind. The second attraction of the proposal is 
that by including both moral and theoretical reasoning within the domain of 
enhancement, it offers some hope of balancing the procedural benefits of algocracy 
against its costs. Suppose, for example, that Zarsky is right that implicit bias is a serious 
problem when humans are kept on the loop and allowed to override algorithmic 
decisions. In that case, epistemic enhancement could be directed at neutralising the 
problem of implicit bias, while at the same time increasing cognitive ability, thereby 
allowing for human participation without undermining procedural benefits of the 
algocratic system. 
 
 Despite these attractions, the proposal is ultimately unpersuasive. To see why, we 
need to draw some conceptual distinctions. As Nicholas Agar points out (2013), there is 
  
an important distinction between what we might call “modest” and “radical” forms of 
enhancement. Modest enhancement is that which is intended to enhance us up to, or 
slightly beyond, the current extremes of human performance and ability. Radical 
enhancement is that which tries to transform us into posthumans, into beings with 
capacities and abilities that exceed what is currently possible for humans (Kurzweil 
2006). It’s not entirely clear whether Danaher intends his concept of epistemic 
enhancement to cover both modest and radical forms of enhancement. His definition 
speaks of improving or adding to current human capacities, which suggests it might be 
both. Nevertheless, for the time being, I shall assume that it only refers to modest forms 
of enhancement. I’ll return to the possibility of radical enhancement toward the end of 
this article. 
 
 Working with that assumption, I think it becomes obvious why Danaher’s 
proposal would not resolve the threat of algocracy. Algocratic processes are unlikely to 
be human-like, particularly when they involve datasets with billions of components, 
when the matching and sorting processes are non-interpretable, and when they are 
integrated into complex algorithmic ecosystems. In short: without external constraints 
algocratic systems are likely to rely on processes and capacities that are radically 
beyond what is possible for human beings to understand.  Thus, even if enhancement 
technologies enabled more humans to reach the extremes of human ability, they would 
do nothing to address the threat of algocracy. At most they might level the playing field 
between different groups of human beings. This might address the threat of epistocracy, 
but not that of algocracy. 
 
 This, however, throws open an intriguing possibility. If epistemic enhancements 
could be used to stave off the threat of epistocracy, and if the human reviewability 
solution discussed above could succeed in legally restricting algocratic systems to those 
that are understandable by epistemically elite human beings, then we might have a way 
in which to accommodate the threat. For then, we could have the advantages of the 
algorithms, and avoid replacing the threat of algocracy with the threat of epistocracy. 
 
 This is certainly an intriguing possibility but we need to be realistic as well. It 
may not be possible to restrict algocratic systems to those that are understandable by 
human beings: the technical, economic, political and personal interests at stake may not 
allow for this. Furthermore, there are several obstacles that would need to be cleared in 
  
order to implement a solution of this sort. First, we would actually need to have the 
requisite enhancement technologies. Much of the debate over human enhancement 
involves speculation about possible future technologies, not currently available ones. 
Current and proposed enhancement technologies have modest and incompletely 
understood effects. It may be that we cannot develop the requisite technologies in time 
to address the threat of algocracy. Second, even if we did have such technologies, they 
would need to be made widely available, not just restricted to wealthy elites who can 
afford them. Third, availability by itself would not address the problem since the 
technologies would not magically imbue us with the requisite knowledge and 
understanding. There would need to be a wide-ranging public education programme on 
the nature of the various algocratic systems as well (see Machin 2009 on the difficulties 
of public education). It may be possible to clear these obstacles, but we shouldn’t be 
tricked into thinking it will be easy. 
 
 But perhaps there are easier ways? Ones which rely on more immediately 
available technologies? The final two solutions consider this possibility. 
 
 5.3 - Embrace sousveillance technologies 
 This “solution” probably wouldn’t bear mentioning except for the fact that some 
have actually suggested it in response to concerns about algocracy,27 and, more 
importantly, because it sets up the more interesting final solution. “Sousveillance” is a 
twist on the term “surveillance”. Where the latter term means to watch “from above” 
(i.e. from a position of authority) the former means to watch “from below” (i.e. from the 
perspective of the ordinary citizen) (Mann 2013; Mann, Nolan & Wellman 2003). 
 
 Sousveillance advocates argue for a type of radical transparency (Brin 1997; Ali 
& Mann 2013). If the problem with big data algorithms is the constant monitoring and 
surveillance of our activities by economic and political elites, then the solution is to turn 
the surveillance technology back on those economic and political elites. Veillance 
technologies are, after all, widely available, and with the advent of Google Glass, and 
similar wearable monitoring devices, they are likely to become even more widely 
available. We can use the data captured by these devices to empower ourselves to hold 
those authorities to account. “Sunlight”, “disinfectant” and other cliches abound. 
                                                            
27 David Brin one of the chief proponents of sousveillance, has explicitly suggested this in response to 




 The father of the sousveillance movement — Steve Mann — has himself argued 
that the widespread use of sousveillance could correct for some of the legitimacy 
problems inherent in bureaucratic systems of control. He specifically argues that 
sousveillance can be used to correct for the asymmetries of information and 
understanding that are inherent in our transactions with bureaucratic institutions (like 
public authorities and courts). If we are unfairly targeted by such institutions, 
sousveillance technologies will allow us to share our story with the bureaucrats with 
“full documentary evidence rather than mere testimony” (Ali and Mann 2013, 250). This 
is empowering. And when coupled with freedom of information laws that give us access 
to the internal regulations and rules of bureaucratic institutions, Mann argues that 
sousveillance technologies provide a powerful recipe for restoring legitimacy. 
 
 To the extent that these bureaucratic systems are themselves reliant on algorithms, 
we might hope that sousveillance technologies could correct for the threat of algocracy 
too. But, of course, any such hope is forlorn. Contrary to what Mann seems to suggest, 
the mere possession of sousveillance technologies does not correct for epistemic 
asymmetries. The user of the technologies has to be able to understand the rational basis 
for the bureaucratic decisions, and they cannot do this with the veillance technology 
alone. If the rational basis for bureaucratic decisions was entirely determined by the 
human collection and processing of data, there might be a chance of correcting for the 
imbalance of power. Ordinary humans could then directly engage with and understand 
the reasoning process, and could use the sousveillance technologies to supply their own 
data and keep the bureaucrats honest in their dealings. But if the rational basis for the 
decisions is not determined by humans, but instead by complex ecosystems of 
algorithms, the situation is rather different. No amount of sousveillance could redress 
that imbalance. 
 
 The problem here is that sousveillance technologies, at least in their purest form, 
are mere data-collection devices. The comprehension and understanding of that data is 
up to their human users.28 But this raises another possibility. What if every human being 
not only had their own veillance technologies but also had the assistance of their own 
data-mining and processing algorithms? In other words, what if each human being could 
                                                            
28 Of course, there may be some processing whenever sousveillance technologies record digital and audio 
information, but that is not the kind of processing and sorting that would be made possible if humans had 
their own mining algorithms. 
  
form a partnership or alliance with their own algorithms? Would that solve the 
problem? This is what the final solution suggests. 
 
 5.4 - Form individual partnerships with algorithms 
 I will discuss two possible forms that a partnering solution could take: the non-
integrative form, which would involve individualised pairing with algorithmic systems 
that are not-integrated into human biology; and the integrative form, which would 
involve the integration of algorithmic systems into human biology. The former is 
realisable in the immediate future; the latter is much more fanciful and speculative. 
Both are doubtful solutions to the problem. 
 
 We shall start with the non-integrative form. This is just a slight modification of 
the sousveillance solution. Where the sousveillance advocate calls for everyone to have 
their own data-monitoring technologies in order to hold authorities to account, the 
advocate of non-integrative algorithmic partnerships simply adds to this the claim that 
everyone should have their own data-mining technology too. This is effectively like 
having your own private AI-assistant, who can help you to comprehend and understand 
the other algorithmic processes that affect your life. The idea is that this is empowering 
as you no longer need to defer to an epistemic elite in order to understand what is going 
on.  
 
 This kind of non-integrative partnership system is already being advocated by a 
number of economists and technologists (Cowen 2013; Brynjolfsson & McAfee 2011 & 
2014). They focus on the problem of technological unemployment and argue that 
partnerships of this sort may be the only way in which human beings can maintain their 
employability in the coming era of artificial intelligence. The example of computer 
chess is often trotted out to illustrate the point (Cowen 2013; Brynjolfsson & McAfee 
2014; Thompson 2013). Computers started to surpass elite humans in chess-playing 
ability in the late 1990s, but this did not render humans obsolete. In large part, this is 
because chess is just a game and a test of human, not machine ability; but it is also 
because humans started to pair-up with computers, forming human-computer chess-
playing teams. This has had an interesting result. The best chess being played today is 
not being played by computers, nor by humans, but by these human-computer teams. It 
seems that by partnering-up with computers, humans have actually enhanced the quality 
  
of their chess. The “Quantified Self” movement29 provides another example of the 
benefits of such partnerships. Members of this movement advocate self-
experimentation, and the use of individualised data-monitoring and processing 
technologies, in order to improve their self-understanding and enhance their 
performance. This has been done primarily in relation to personal health and fitness 
(Ferriss 2011), but it can encompass cognitive and emotional reasoning too (Thompson 
2013). 
 
 So the basic idea is that by partnering up with algorithms, individual human 
beings can retain autonomy, enhance their cognitive powers and understanding, and this 
might just be enough to ensure their continued ability to meaningfully participate in 
algorithmic decision-making processes. Of course, this suggestion suffers from three 
major defects. First, it runs foul of the big data divide problem mentioned earlier 
(Andrejevic 2014; Mittelstadt and Floridi 2015). As several authors have pointed out, 
individual users are not well-placed to take advantage of the epistemic benefits of data-
mining technologies. Those benefits accrue to those who can generate and control big 
datasets. This favours wealthy, large-scale concerns (companies, governments, 
universities), not individual citizens. Second, and adding to the first problem, most 
individual humans are unlikely to be able to design and create their own algorithmic 
partners. They would have to rely on others to do this for them, which would then 
simply bring us back to the problem of epistocracy. Third, it is not at all clear that this 
kind of non-integrative partnering system would ensure that humans can participate and 
engage with such processes. Again, the example of human-computer chess teams is 
instructive in this regard (Cowen 2013, Ch 5). The clear evidence from the past decade 
and half is that the top chess teams are not the ones in which the humans understand the 
game the best. Indeed, being a top-ranked individual chess player may actually be a 
disadvantage when partnering up with a computer. The top-ranked player is too inclined 
to second-guess the computer’s judgment. It seems that greater deference to the 
computer’s intelligence is needed in order to succeed (Cowen 2013, 82). But this 
suggests that human-computer partnerships might not resolve the threat of algocracy at 
all. Indeed, they might hasten it. If we all form individualised partnerships with 
                                                            
29 See, generally, http://quantifiedself.com; Thompson (2013) also discusses the phenomenon. The story 
of Chris Dancy, a Denver-based IT executive who is known as the world’s “most connected man”, might 
also be instructive. Dancy wears up to 10 data-collection devices on his person every day, in addition to 
other non-wearable devices. He claims that this has greatly improved his life. See 
http://www.dw.de/worlds-most-connected-man-finds-better-life-through-data/a-17600597 for an 
interview with him (accessed 1/3/15). 
  
algorithms, we might hasten our path to moral patiency, we would become recipients of 
the wisdom of our AI-assistants, not true agents involved in understanding and shaping 
our own destinies. 
 
 There is, however, a philosophical objection to this line of reasoning. Within the 
philosophy of mind, there is a school of thought that endorses the “extended mind 
thesis” (Clark & Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010). According to this thesis, our mental 
processes are naturally extended into our artifacts and technologies. The thesis derives 
support from the functionalist theory of mind, which holds that because mental states 
are determined by their position within a functional network there is no reason why 
such a network should be limited to what takes place inside the human brain. Thus, for 
example, my email folder could be viewed as an extension of my mental faculty of 
memory: it contains a record of conversations and exchanges I have had with family, 
friends and co-workers, and I frequently use it to assist my recall. In a similar vein, why 
couldn’t our faculties of understanding and comprehension naturally extend into the 
algorithms with which we are partnered?   
 
 The extended mind thesis does hold out some hope for the defender of the non-
integrative partnership solution. But there are two reasons for doubting its consolations. 
The first is that it is a controversial philosophical thesis and so an unpromising basis on 
which to rest a solution to serious social-political problem. The second is that even if 
the extended mind thesis provides a useful framework for explaining and understanding 
psychological processes, there can be further distinctions between those processes that 
affect its application to the threat of algocracy. I would suggest that legitimate 
participation in public decision-making requires conscious understanding of the rational 
basis for those decisions. There is nothing in the extended mind thesis to suggest that 
the external artifacts that form part of our “minds” deliver this kind of conscious 
understanding. When I rely on a calculator to perform some complex mathematical 
operation on my behalf, I do not consciously represent and understand that series of 
operations. There is no reason to think it would be any different when pairing up with 
other computerised processes. 
 
 That leaves us with the possibility of forming integrative partnerships with 
computers. The suggestion here is that instead of relying on external devices to assist 
our interactions with the world, we actually incorporate those devices into our 
  
physiology, i.e. we turn ourselves into bits of technology. This already happens, to some 
extent, with prosthetic devices that are integrated into human biology. To address the 
threat of algocracy, the integration would need to be at a cognitive level, allowing us, in 
a sense, to understand the world in the same way as the algorithm. The idea might be 
something along the lines of uploading our minds to a digital substrate or replacing our 
brains with a set of neural prosthetics. 
 
 As a solution to the threat of algocracy, the notion of integrative partnerships 
suffers from at least two defects. The first is that it is highly fanciful and speculative. 
Though the idea of digital copies and uploads is commonplace in science fiction, and 
beloved by transhumanists and techno-utopians, we are certainly a long way from 
realising such possibilities. And that’s assuming that they are even conceptually 
coherent possibilities: some might argue that the mental could never really be replaced 
by an artificial analogue.  
 
 The second defect is rather more subtle and has to do with the possible effects of 
such integrative partnerships on the nature of human agency and on the kinds political 
organisation we value. The threat of algocracy is most acutely felt in a political system 
that is predicated upon liberal principles. After all, it is in such a system that the need to 
respect the individual’s moral agency — to allow them to meaningfully participate in 
public decision-making — is an important concern. This concern in turn rests on certain 
core beliefs about what it means to be an autonomous moral agent. If an integrative 
partnership with technology is simply an attempt to preserve the human agent in an 
artificial form, then these values and concerns will still be relevant. The problem is that 
if the integrative partnership does nothing more than preserve the human agent, it is not 
clear that the threat of algocracy will be solved. For it is not clear that mere preservation 
would allow for comprehension and understanding of the algocratic systems. It may be 
that we need to integrate ourselves with those algocratic systems as well.30 This might 
require our consciousnesses to be linked into the global internet of things, so that we 
can appreciate and understand the datastreams and mining processes that govern 
collective decision making. But, of course, everyone would have to do the same thing. It 
is not clear that the concept of the individual moral agent would survive such a 
                                                            
30 This is the vision of transhumanists like Ray Kurzweil who seek to saturate the cosmos with our 
intelligence, i.e. to make everything in the universe an extension of and input into our cognitive processes 
(Kurzweil 2006, 29). 
  
technological transformation (Lipschulz & Hester 2014). And so it is not clear that the 
threat of algocracy would be relevant in such a world. 
 
 After that flight of fancy, we must, alas, come back down to earth. I do not wish 
to completely disparage the notion that partnerships with technology could form part of 
a solution to the threat of algocracy. They certainly could. But there are difficulties here, 
both technological and philosophical.  
 
 6. Conclusion 
 This article has defended three major theses. First, it has argued that there is such 
a thing as the threat of algocracy. This is a threat to the legitimacy of public decision-
making processes, which is posed by the opacity of certain algocratic governance 
systems. The threat is a real one, distinct from related concerns with privacy and 
ownership of data. 
 
 Second, it has argued that it may not be possible or desirable to resist the threat of 
algocracy, i.e. to simply stop relying on algocratic decision-making systems. The 
technologies that make algocracy possible are becoming less noticeable and more 
ubiquitous. And any costs they have in terms of opacity need to be weighed against 
their other instrumental and procedural benefits. 
 
 Third, it has argued that it is also difficult to accommodate the threat of 
algocracy, i.e. to find some way for humans to “stay on the loop” and meaningfully 
participate in the decision-making process, whilst retaining the benefits of the algocratic 
systems. Some accommodating solutions are naive and fanciful, others simply miss the 
mark, addressing the threat of epistocracy but not the threat of algocracy. In the end, the 
most viable solution may be some combination of reviewability and enhancement 
(which could encompass human-machine partnership, integrative or otherwise). The 
former might be able to legally limit the types of algocratic system that are used by 
insisting upon a right and possibility of human review; the latter might then be able to 
prevent this solution from simply collapsing into the threat of epistocracy.  
 
 But this conclusion is somewhat pessimistic. Although it may be relatively easy 
to restructure the legal system so as to insist on reviewability, the probability of 
  
successfully creating and distributing appropriate enhancement technologies within the 
requisite timeframe is much more uncertain. Furthermore, the growth of algocratic 
systems combined with the ways in which such systems become woven into ever more 
complex algorithmic ecosystems, may be such as to push them beyond the control and 
understanding of their human creators. In that case, achieving individual epistemic 
elitism may no longer be enough. In short, we may be on the cusp of creating a 
governance system which severely constrains and limits the opportunities for human 
engagement, without any readily available solution. This may be necessary to achieve 
other instrumental or procedural gains, but we need to be sure we can live with the 
tradeoff. 
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